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Abstract
The question of how insurance programs affect agricultural input use is commanding increasing attention.
Previous studies disagree on the likely effects of insurance on fertilizer application rates. Whether insurance is
a complement or a substitute for fertilizer depends, in part, on whether the probability of low yields is
positively or negatively affected by increased fertilizer rates. This study uses field-level data measuring the
response of corn yields to nitrogen fertilizer to determine if the technical relationship between yield and
nitrogen fertilizer supports the hypothesis that crop insurance or revenue insurance could induce increased
application rates. Our results indicate no support for this hypothesis. At all nitrogen fertilizer rates and
reasonable levels of risk aversion, nitrogen fertilizer and insurance are substitutes, suggesting that those who
purchase insurance are likely to decrease nitrogen fertilizer applications.
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ABSTRACT 
The question of how insurance programs affect agricultural input use is commanding 
increasing attention. Previous studies disagree on the likely effects of insurance on fertilizer 
application rates. Whether insurance is a complement or a substitute for fertilizer depends, in 
part, on whether the probability of low yields is positively or negatively affected by increased 
fertilizer rates. This study uses field-level data measuring the response of com yields to nitrogen 
fertilizer to determine if the technical relationship between yield and nitrogen fertilizer supports 
the hypothesis that crop insurance or revenue insurance could induce increased application rates. 
Our results indicate no support for this hypothesis. At all nitrogen fertilizer rates and reasonable 
levels of risk aversion, nitrogen fertilizer and insurance are substitutes, suggesting that those who 
purchase insurance are likely to decrease nitrogen fertilizer applications. 
INPUT DEMAND UNDER YIELD AND REVENUE INSURANCE 
The effect of agricultural insurance on optimal per acre input levels is in dispute. 
Horowitz and Lichtenberg, in an econometric study, conclude that crop insurance increases the 
use of fertilizer and pesticides. They estimate that the purchase of crop insurance induces 
midwestern farmers to increase their nitrogen fertilizer applications by approximately 19 percent 
and pesticide expenditures by 21 percent. Two other studies conclude that per acre input levels 
decrease under insurance. Smith and Goodwin, in an econometric analysis of crop insurance and 
chemical input decisions on Kansas wheat farming, conclude that nitrogen fertilizer expenditures 
decrease by $5.00 per acre. And Quiggin, Karagiannis, and Stanton conclude that midwestern 
grain farmers who purchase crop insurance decrease fertilizer and chemical applications about 1 0 
percent. 
The issue of how input decisions change under crop and revenue insurance schemes is 
attracting increased attention because of proposals to force farmers to rely more on insurance and 
less on direct government subsidies. For example, a group oflowa farmers and farm 
organizations has proposed the elimination of current commodity programs in favor of a plan that 
insures gross revenue. If optimal chemical use increases under insurance, as suggested by 
Horowitz and Lichtenberg, then it is likely that a move away from direct government payments 
and towards increased reliance on insurance will result in greater environmental pollution from 
agriculture. However, if optimal chemical use declines significantly under insurance, as 
concluded by Smith and Goodwin and Quiggins, Karagiannis, and Stanton, then the environment 
may benefit, but moral hazard issues will make the pricing of insurance difficult. 
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The Horowitz and Lichtenberg result depends on the assumption that farmers are risk 
averse and that increased applications of fertilizer and pesticides increase the probability of! ow 
yields. The pesticide result of Horowitz and Lichtenberg is somewhat surprising because it is 
widely accepted that pesticides do not generally increase yield potential. They only affect yields 
when damaging agents are present (Lichtenberg and Zilberman). Thus, pesticide use should 
generally decrease the probability of low yields, which suggests that a government program that 
insures against low yields should decrease pesticide use, not increase use. For nitrogen fertilizer 
use, Babcock and Blackmer's results indicate that optimizing risk-neutral farmers have the 
incentive to apply nitrogen fertilizer to reduce the probability of low yields. If true, then 
insurance should decrease the marginal payoff from nitrogen fertilizer, thus lowering optimal 
nitrogen rates. 
This paper analyzes the issue of input demand under insurance differently than the 
previous econometric studies by estimating the farm-level technology that farmers face and then 
simulating what would be the optimal response to insurance under the estimated technology. The 
advantage of this approach is that it provides insight into how input use actually affects the 
distribution of crop yield. The disadvantage of the approach is that data measuring actual farmer 
decisions are not used. With this proviso, this paper makes two contributions that lead to a better 
understanding of the effect that insurance has on optimal input decisions. First, a careful 
specification of how nitrogen fertilizer affects the distribution of yield is estimated, thus showing 
the effect that increased fertilizer rates have on the probability of low yields. The second 
contribution is an examination of the effect of crop and revenue insurance under joint price and 
yield uncertainty. The analysis moves away from the common assumption that prices and yields 
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are independent bivariate normal random variables by allowing price to be positively skewed and 
yields to be negatively skewed. A method that allows any degree of price and yield correlation to 
be imposed on generated random deviates is used to estimate tbe effects of nitrogen fertilizer on 
revenue distributions. Such a method that allows correlated prices and yields is critical in 
production regions tbat grow a large proportion of a crop. The analysis is conducted for Iowa 
com production. The results are useful in contrast to those of Horowitz and Lichtenberg and 
Quiggin, Karagiannis, and Stanton. 
Optimal Input Decisions Under Insurance 
To clarifY the issues, a simple model of yield insurance is presented first. Suppose tbat 
the farmer has an insured yield level, y 1, and tbat the government provides tbis level of insurance 
at a fixed cost that, without loss of generality, will be set to zero. Thus, we focus not on the 
demand for insurance, but rather on how optimal input decisions change once insurance is 
purchased. If actual yield, y, is less than Y~> an indemnity in tbe amount ~(y1 - y) is paid where 
~ is the indemnity price. For now, we assumes tbat P1 = P, a nonstochastic output price. Given 
that y1 and tbe insurance premium are fixed, the farmer's problem is to select a level of input X 
to maximize expected utility of profits. The stochastic relationship between y and X is captured 
by tbe conditional probability density function g(y[X), a :S: y :S: b. Let ;r; 1 = Py1 - PxX and 
n 2 = Py- PxX. Then the farmer's problem is to choose X to 
Y1 b 
Max EU = J U(n 1)g(y[X)dy+ J U(n 2 )g(y[X)dy. (1) 
a Y! 
The first -order condition is 
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yf
1 
U(n 1) dg(y\X) dy+ fb U(n2) dg(y\X) dy- PxEU'(n) = 0, (2) JX JX 
a Y1 
where 
~ b 
EU'(n) = J U'(n1)g(y\X)dy+ J U'(n2 )g(y\X)dy, (3) 
a YI 
and Px is the per unit price of X The second-order condition is /'!,.=a E~(1t) ,; 0, which will be 
ax 
assumed negative. The special case of no insurance is analyzed by setting y 1 =a. 
The critical question is, under what conditions does an increase in y 1 increase the optimal 
level of X? Differentiation of (2) and (3) with respect to X and y 1 results in the following 
comparative static result: 
ax Y! Y! a c \X) 
Oy
1 
= -/'!,.-1[-PxPU"(1t 1) I g(y\X)cry + PU'(1t 1) I g :X dy], (4) 
which can be rearranged as 
YI 
y
1 
" dlog J a(y\X)dy 
::; = -/'!,.-! PU'(1t 1) fg(y\X)cry[Px -~(~~;) + a dX ]. (5) 
a 
Equation (5) is analogous to equation (3) in Horowitz and Lichtenberg. The terms outside 
the brackets in (5) are positive. Under risk aversion the first term inside the brackets is positive. 
That is, as Horowitz and Lichtenberg point out, increases in the insurance level tend to increase 
input use because the "scale of production risk" (Sandmo) is decreased. The second bracketed 
term in ( 5) is the percent change in the probability that an indemnity is paid due to a one-unit 
increase in X A sufficient condition for (5) to be positive is if an increase in X increases the 
probability of low yields; that is, X is a risk-increasing input. 
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The two panels of Figure 1 illustrate how the sign of the second term in brackets is 
determined. In Panel A, an increase in X from X 1 to X2 increases the probability of achieving 
high yields and decreases the probability of achieving low yields. As drawn, the density of y is 
decreased for ally < y I and ( 5) cannot be unambiguously signed unless the producer is risk 
neutral, in which case ( 5) is negative. That is, input use and yield insurance are substitutes. In 
Panel B, an increase in X increases both the probability of high and low yields. As drawn, the 
density of y increases for ally< YJ> and (5) is positive for all risk aversion levels. Thus, the two 
critical factors that determine how insurance affects input use is the degree of risk aversion and 
the marginal effect of increases of X on the conditional density of y. 
When is it likely that the second bracketed term in (5) is positive? First note that for a = 
Yb the expected marginal product of X must be positive for (2) to hold. Thus, for at least some 
range of y I > a, the marginal product of X will also be positive and an increase in X must increase 
both the probability of high yields and low yields as drawn in Panel B, ifthe second bracketed 
term in (5) is to be positive. Can pesticides achieve this kind of yield impact? It is well accepted 
that pesticides only affect yields in the presence of damaging agents. That is, pesticides do not 
increase yield potential. Thus, it seems likely that increased pesticide use could increase the 
probability of high yields. But when will pesticide use increase the probability of low yields? 
That is, when will increased pesticide use increase the probability of damage? To our knowledge, 
there are no studies that demonstrate that pest populations increase with increased pesticide use 
in a single growing season. Thus the increased probability of low yields cannot be caused by 
increased pest damage. If pesticides themselves can damage crops, such as overspray from 
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herbicides, then increased use may increase the probability of low yields. But the pesticide must 
have the seemingly rare characteristic that it can be applied at rates that damage crops and still 
provide more protection against the damaging agent. Unless farmers' risk aversion levels explain 
the results of Horowitz and Lichtenberg, the most important pesticides in com production must 
have this characteristic and insured farmers must know about it. Furthermore, insured farmers 
must be submitting claims for yield losses that are caused, at least in part, by increased pesticide 
use. 
Now how likely is it that nitrogen fertilizer can exhibit this sort of behavior? As Horowitz 
and Lichtenberg point out, fertilizer must be applied at rates that decrease yields when growing 
conditions are bad. But as the previous discussion points out, this damage must occur at rates of 
fertilizer use rates that also improve yields when growing conditions are good. The empirical 
analysis that follows sheds light on this issue. 
This discussion about how yield insurance affects the per acre use of inputs under output 
price certainty guides the determination of how revenue insurance under price uncertainty affects 
input use. Suppose that a payment is made if revenue, R, falls below some insurance level, R1. If 
price and yield are independent with marginal density functions h(P), P > 0, and 
g(y\X), a :o;y :o; b, then the producer's optimizing condition is to choose X to maximize 
cr.:>R1 /P oo b 
EU= f JU(il 1)h(P)g(y\X)dydP+ f JU(il 2 )h(P)g(y\X)dydP, (6) 
0 a 
where n1 = R1 - PxX and n2 = Py- PxX· From (6), the effect of increasing R1 on optimal X can 
be derived from differentiating the first-order condition with respect to X and R1 : 
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The sufficient condition for an increase in the coverage level to increase X is directly analogous 
to the sufficient condition under yield insurance, namely that an increase in X increases the 
probability that a claim will be made. For revenue insurance, the claim is made with respect to 
revenue rather than simply yields, but the results illustrated in Figure 1 hold true for both yield 
and revenue insurance when yields and prices are uncorrelated. If price and yield are correlated, 
then the joint distribution function must be used to determine how revenue insurance affects 
optimal input decisions. A method for estimating the effects of yield and revenue insurance for 
correlated price and yield is presented in a later section. But first we estimate the marginal yield 
distribution and revenue distribution. 
Estimating the Effects of Nitrogen Fertilizer on Corn Yield Distributions 
One critical factor in determining the effects of insurance on optimal input decisions is 
estimating the marginal effect of input use on the density function of yields. We estimate a yield 
distribution with parameters that are functions of applied nitrogen fertilizer. It is well accepted 
that crop yields are skewed so the beta distribution, which can exhibit both negative and positive 
skewness, is used as the parent distribution. The conditional beta distribution can be written 
h(y!X) 
f[p(X) + q(X)] (y- a)P(x)-1 (b- y)q(x)-1 
f[p(X)]f[ q(X)] bp(x)+q(x)-1 (8) 
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The functional forms relating X top and q need to be flexible enough to exhibit both of the types 
of technical relationships exhibited in Figure 1. This flexibility is achieved by the following 
functional forms for the p and q functions: 
P =Po + P1X5 + PzX 
q = qo +q1X5 +q2X. 
(9) 
Data to estimate the parameters of (8) and (9) were generated by a series of experiments 
on four cooperating Iowa corn farms from 1986 to 1991. The four farm locations were widely 
dispersed across Iowa. Ten rates of nitrogen fertilizer, varying from 0 to 300 pounds per acre 
were applied on each farm each year. (Typical rates for continuous corn production in Iowa are 
between 125 and 200 pounds per acre.) Three replications of each rate resulted in 30 
observations per site-year. Thus, 600 observations were used to estimate the conditional yield 
distributions. Site-specific effects on the p and q functions were captured by including site-
specific constant terms in (9) and by specifying site-specific a and b parameters in (8). For each 
site, a was set at five bushels less than the minimum observed yield and b was set at ten bushels 
greater than the maximum observed yield. The maximum likelihood routine ofTSP was used to 
estimate the parameters of (8) and (9) and are presented in Table 1. Figure 2 shows how the 
estimated yield distribution changes as nitrogen fertilizer increases from zero to 300 pounds per 
acre. As can be seen, there is very little effect on the estimated yield distribution as the fertilizer 
rate increases from 200 pounds per acre to 300 pounds per acre. Figure 3 gives a more detailed 
view for these rates. 
As discussed, insurance schemes increase input applications if more inputs increase the 
probability oflow yields. As shown in Figures 2 and 3, for rates of nitrogen fertilizer less than 
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250 pounds per acre, increases in fertilizer applications rates decrease the probability of 
achieving low yields. Moving from 250 pounds per acre to 300 pounds per acre, however, results 
in an increase in the probability oflow yields for yields less than about 100 bushels per acre. For 
rates up to 200 pounds per acre, increases in fertilizer rates sharply decrease the probability of 
low yields. For rates over 200 pounds per acre, increasing nitrogen fertilizer has very little effect 
on the probability distribution of yields. 
While we are careful about drawing general conclusions from these empirical results, 
conversations with extension agronomists from the U.S. Corn Belt confirm that the estimated 
yield distributions illustrated in Figure 2 are typical of how corn yields respond to nitrogen 
fertilizer in the Corn Belt. If true, then there is little likelihood that the Horowitz and Lichtenberg 
results were caused by nitrogen fertilizer increasing the probability oflow corn yields. It could be 
that risk aversion caused the increase. Or their results could be explained by their footnote 9, 
which proposes that perhaps farmers who take out lines of credit are more likely to buy crop 
insurance and use more inputs. The extent to which risk aversion could cause the reported effect 
for a farmer with the production technology illustrated in Figure 2 is estimated with a Monte 
Carlo analysis. 
Estimating the Distribution of Revenue 
Decision models with random yields and prices have generally assumed that both are 
normally distributed (see, for example, Lapan and Moschini). The reason for this assumption is 
that the use of any other distribution quickly makes the problem both analytically intractable for 
theoretical studies and numerically intractable for Monte Carlo studies. In addition, when prices 
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and yields are correlated, the bivariate normal distribution is really the only option that allows 
specification of a desired degree of correlation. But it is well known that crop yields are skewed. 
And studies of market efficiency typically assume that price is lognormally distributed (Wilson 
and Fung). Monte Carlo studies use this prior knowledge about the marginal distributions of 
price and yield to draw nonnormal deviates. But we are left with the problem of imposing a 
desired degree of dependence on the deviates. 
One solution to this problem is offered by Johnson and Tenenbein when the level of 
dependence can be captured by Spearman's rank correlation coefficient, Ps- Because p, is 
invariant to nonlinear monotonic transformations, it is ideally suited for generating correlated 
nonnormal deviates for Monte Carlo simulations. The method is based on the simple idea that 
taking a linear combination of two independent deviates creates dependence. The method is 
presented here for convenience. 
The problem is to generate a pair of random variables (P, y) with specified marginals 
F; ( P) and F; (y) . For the application in this paper F; ( P) is the lognormal distribution and F;, (y) 
is the beta distribution. Following Johnson and Tenenbein, let 
U=U' (10) 
and 
V = cU' +(1-c)V' (11) 
where U' and V' are iid random variables with any common density function g(t) and c is a 
constant in the interval (0, 1). Johnson and Tenenbein provide values of c that yield desired 
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levels of p, for different specifications of g(t). In this application, we use the standard normal 
distribution for g(t). 
Let P' = HI ( U) and y' = H 2 ( V) where HI ( u) and H2 ( v) are the distribution functions of 
U and V. Define 
(12) 
and 
(13) 
or 
(14) 
Johnson and Tenenbein note that because P', y', and-y' are uniformly distributed over the 
interval (0, 1), P andy will have a joint distribution with marginals F;(P) and Fz(y). For Monte 
Carlo studies, knowledge ofthese two marginal distributions is all that is required. Thus, we do 
not need to worry about the general properties of the joint distribution. Positively correlate 
deviates are obtained from (13) and negative values are obtained from (14). For price and yields, 
negative correlations are used. The two levels of p, used in this study are 0 and -.3. From 
Johnson and Tenenbein, the required levels of c using the normal distribution for g(t) are 0 and 
.248. SHAZAM (White) was used to implement this procedure. 
Prices are assumed to follow the lognormal distribution because it complies with the 
theory of efficient markets (Samuelson), and because it has found widespread use in the 
commodity pricing literature (Black; Wilson and Fung). The mean for the marginal distribution 
of price was taken from the September futures contracts quoted in April. The September contract 
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is the closest to the com harvest and April is the month in which most nitrogen fertilizer is 
applied. The Black options pricing formula was used to estimate the standard deviation of the log 
of prices. The average mean and standard deviation from 1991 to 1994 were used to parameterize 
the lognormal distribution: 
F., (P) = (P.fiiat exp[ -.5{log(P)- S} I a 2 ], a =.174; s = 0.921. (15) 
To account for the average basis in Iowa, $0.35 per bushel was subtracted from the prices drawn 
from (15). This results in a mean price of $2.20 per bushel and a standard deviation of $.45 per 
bushel. 
A Monte Carlo procedure for maximizing (1) and ( 6) was used. The marginal effect of X 
on the yield and revenue distributions was obtained by generating 1,000 yield and price deviates 
for one-pound increments of X. For each rate of X= x, expected utility under no insurance was 
calculated by: 
I 10oo 
EU(X= x) = -LU(P,y, -Pxx), 
1000 i=l 
(16) 
where prices were drawn from (15) and yields were drawn (7) with the parameter values given in 
Table 1. Parameter values for site 12 were used in the simulations. The rate of X that resulted in 
the maximum value ofEU was taken to be the optimal nitrogen rate. Denote that rate by X* At 
X*, expected yield and expected revenue were calculated to serve as the base from which the 
insurance coverage levels were defined. Coverage levels of 70, 80, 90, and 100 percent of 
average yield and revenue at X* were considered. Expected utility under crop insurance was 
calculated by: 
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N N, 1000- N IOOO-N, 
EU(X=x)=-1 _LU(P,y,+PrCYr-yJ-Pxx)+ 1 ,LU(P,y,-Pxx) (17) 
1000 i=l 1000 i=l 
where the first summation is taken over the observations for which y1 < y 1 (of which there are 
N1) and the second summation is taken over the observations for which y1 > y 1 • The rate of X 
that results in the highest value of (17) is taken to be the expected utility maximizing rate. 
Expected utility under revenue insurance was calculated similarly: 
where the first summation is taken over the observations for which P,y1 < R1 (of which there are 
N,) and the second summation is taken over the observations for which P,y1 > R1 . The rate of X 
that results in the highest value of (18) is taken to be the expected utility maximizing rate under 
revenue insurance. A CARA utility function was assumed. Appropriate values of absolute risk 
aversion were selected by scaling the problem to a single acre of corn and by assuming that the 
risk premium was 0, 20, and 40 percent of the standard deviation of revenue (Babcock, Choi, and 
Feinerman). 
Results 
Table 1 presents the simulation results for crop insurance under the assumption of 
uncorrelated yield and price. Reported first the results under risk neutrality. The expected profit 
maximizing nitrogen fertilizer rate is 202 pounds per acre with no crop insurance. Expected yield 
is 136.5 bushels per acre and expected revenue is $300.08 per acre. Thus, returns over fertilizer 
costs are $269.78 per acre. The crop insurance payout is assumed to made at a rate of $1.65 per 
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bushel, which is 75 percent of the expected price of$2.20. As yield guarantees increase from 70 
percent of average yield to 100 percent of average yield, optimal fertilizer rates decrease. Thus, 
as suggested by Figure 2, decreases in fertilizer rates increase the probability of low yields. The 
probability of claims increases from approximately .11 at the 70 percent coverage to more than .5 
at the 1 00 percent coverage, and the expected claims, conditional on a claim being made, 
increase from $21.14 per acre to $43.14 per acre. The unconditional expected payout, found by 
multiplying the probability by the conditional expected payout, increases from $2.28 per acre to 
$22.48 per acre. 
The standard deviation of net returns, which is a measure of the quantity of risk, at the 
202 pounds per acre fertilizer rate is $90.66 per acre. Using Table 2 in Babcock, Choi, and 
Feinerman, a risk premium of20 percent of this standard deviation implies an absolute risk 
aversion coefficient of approximately .0046. A risk premium of 40 percent implies a risk 
aversion coefficient of .01. These two coefficients represent low and moderate levels of risk 
aversion for the simulations presented in Tables 2 and 3. The first conclusion from the sets of 
results is that the introduction of risk aversion at the levels assumed here does not change the 
result that increases in insurance coverage decrease optimal nitrogen fertilizer rates. That is, the 
bracketed term in equation (5) remains negative under risk aversion. Second, the 70 percent 
insurance rate does not induce a large reduction in optimal fertilizer rates. Under moderate risk 
aversion, optimal rates only decrease by 3.54 percent. But at the 100 percent coverage level, the 
introduction of insurance induces a 24.2 percent reduction in optimal fertilizer rates. Thus, it 
appears that moral hazard is a significant problem with crop insurance only at high coverage 
levels. 
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Table 3 presents the corresponding results when price and yield are negatively correlated 
with p, = -.3. A negative correlation reduces the amount of risk a producer faces because price 
is high, on average, when yields are low. Thus, the reduction in optimal fertilizer rates as crop 
insurance coverage levels increase, is less pronounced than under uncorrelated price and yield 
under all levels of risk aversion. 
Our results contrast sharply with those of Horowitz and Lichtenberg. They conclude that 
introducing crop insurance induces a fairly large increase in optimal nitrogen fertilizer use. The 
results presented here suggest that there is only a large response when farmers have a moderate 
level of risk aversion and coverage levels are high. And this large response works in the opposite 
direction. That is, introducing crop insurance induces farmers to decrease fertilizer applications, 
not increase them. Our results support the econometric findings of Smith and Goodwin and 
Quiggin, Karagiannis, and Stanton who found that farmers who buy crop insurance decrease their 
nitrogen fertilizer applications by a modest amount. 
Note that as risk aversion increases, the response of X to increases in y 1 is more negative 
rather than less negative as suggested by equation (5). The reason for this discrepancy is that as 
risk aversion increases, the optimal level of X decreases, which as can be seen by Figure 2 
Yi 
d log J g(ylx )dy 
increases (makes more negative)---""----. Thus, the direct effects of increased risk 
dX 
aversion are overwhelmed by the indirect effect, making dX more negative as risk aversion 
dy/ 
mcreases. 
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Table 4 presents the results for revenue insurance under uncorrelated price and yields for 
revenue coverage levels varying from 70 percent to 100 percent of expected revenue under no 
insurance and risk neutrality. At the 70 percent coverage level, optimal fertilizer rates decrease 
from their optimal levels under no insurance by 2.97 percent under risk neutrality to 7.07 percent 
under moderate risk aversion. (The maximum 14-pound reduction in fertilizer applications 
represents approximately a one-bushel decrease in expected yields.) At the 70 percent coverage 
level, the probability of making a claim is approximately 17 percent, and the unconditional 
expected payout is approximately $5.90 per acre. Both the probability of making a claim and the 
expected indemnities increase rapidly as the coverage level increases. These increases are caused 
both by the direct effect of an increased coverage level and by the decrease in fertilizer rates, 
which shifts the yield distribution to the left. At the 100 percent coverage level, the probability of 
making a claim is .646, which implies that if goverrunent wanted to issue revenue insurance at 
100 percent of expected revenue, then it would have to redefine the level of revenue at which 
insurance begins to pay because expected revenue at 122 pounds per acre of nitrogen fertilizer is 
significantly less than expected revenue at 200 pounds per acre. 
Table 5 presents the results of revenue insurance for negatively correlated prices and 
yields. The qualitative results are the same as for the uncorrelated prices and yields. But under a 
negative correlation, a 70 percent coverage level induces a smaller reduction in optimal fertilizer 
rates than under no correlation. The reduction for the moderately risk averse producer is 5 
percent as compared with a 7 percent reduction under no correlation. The general result that 
fertilizer rates decrease as the coverage level increases still holds. 
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Concluding Remarks 
This study presents estimates of the effect of yield and revenue insurance on optimal per 
acre nitrogen applications on Iowa com production. Because farm-level com yields in Iowa are 
likely correlated with output price, a procedure is used to draw nonnormal correlated random 
deviates for the Monte Carlo analysis. The general conclusion from the analysis is that either 
insurance scheme is likely to lead to relatively minor reductions in farm applications of nitrogen 
fertilizer if the coverage levels are at or below 70 percent of mean yield or revenue. 
One implication of the results is that if recent proposals to replace current commodity 
programs with revenue insurance were adopted, then average per acre payments to Iowa com 
farmers are likely to drop dramatically. Currently, per acre deficiency payments average between 
$30 and $50. Under revenue insurance, average payments at the 70 percent coverage level are 
about $6.00 per acre for uncorrelated yields and prices and about $3.25 per acre whenp s = -.3. 
The corresponding increase in certainty equivalent under the two levels of positive risk aversion 
used in this study are between $5.00 and $15.00 per acre. 
Figure 1.The Effect of Increasing Input Use from X 1 to x2 on the Distribution of Yields 
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density 
0.03 
0 lb/ac 
~ 
0.025 ---- ---- - ---- --- ------ - -- - --- - - - ----- -- -- - -- - --------------- - -- - - - - - - -
0.02 
0.015 
0.01 
0.005 
0 
45 95 145 195 
Yield (bu/ac) 
Figure 3. Effect of High Nitrogen Fertilizer Rates on the Distribution of Corn Yields 
density 
0.014 r------------------------
0.012 
0.01 
0.008 
0.006 
0.004 
0.002 
0 
45 95 145 195 
Yield (bu/ac) 
""' 0 
21 
Table I. Estimated parameters of the conditional beta distribution 
Parameter Estimated Coefficient 
Maximum yield' 
Site 9 I82 
Site IO 200 
Site I I 214 
Site I2 202 
Minimum yieldh 
Site 9 30 
Site IO 25 
Site I I 27 
Site I2 48 
p function 
Constant: 
Site 9 4.60 
Site 10 3.23 
Site I I 3.50 
Site 12 3.I4 
x' -.092 I 
X .00603 
q function 
Constant: 
Site 9 I 1.62 
Site 10 I 1.28 
Site II I 1.45 
Site I2 12.30 
x' -1.353 
X .0456 
Note: See equations (8) and (9) in text for the functional forms. 
'Not estimated. 
Standard Error 
.631 
.533 
.539 
.513 
.094 
.005I I 
1.53 
1.52 
1.51 
1.51 
.235 
.0093 
Table 2. Results for crop insurance paid at $1.65 per bushel for uncorrelated yields and prices (p, = 0) 
Coverage Level Risk Neutrality 
Probability 
Certainty Expected of 
Mean Yield Yield Fertilizer Rate Reduction Equivalence Claims Claims 
percent (bu/ac) (lb/ac) percent ($/ac) ($/ac) probability 
0 0.0 202 0 269.78 0 0 
70 95.55 199 1.49 272.05 21.14 .108 
80 109.20 196 2.97 275.59 28.25 .208 
90 122.85 190 5.94 281.62 35.87 .337 
100 136.50 179 11.4 291.12 43.14 .521 
Risk Aversion Coefficient= .0046 
0 0.0 201 0 252.13 0 0 
70 95.55 196 2.49 255.80 20.89 .Ill 
80 I 09.20 191 4.98 260.85 28.76 .209 
90 122.85 183 8.96 268.66 36.47 .343 
100 136.50 168 16.4 280.07 43.76 .540 
Risk Aversion Coefficient= .0100 
0 0.0 198 0 233.97 0 0 
70 95.55 191 3.54 239.68 21.10 .113 
80 109.20 184 7.07 246.53 29.22 .214 
90 122.85 174 12.1 256.24 37.22 .351 
100 136.50 !50 24.2 269.70 45.03 .580 
Table 3. Results for crop insurance paid at $1.65 per bushel for correlated yields and prices (Ps = -.3) 
Coverage Level Risk Neutrality 
Probability 
Certainty Expected of 
Mean Yield Yield Fertilizer Rate Reduction Equivalence Claims Claims 
percent (bu/ac) (lb/ac) percent ($/ac) ($/ac) probability 
0 0.0 202 0 265.64 0 0 
70 95.55 199 1.49 267.90 21.14 .108 
80 I 09.20 196 2.97 271.44 28.25 .208 
90 122.85 191 5.44 277.47 35.87 .337 
100 136.50 180 10.9 286.97 43.14 .518 
Risk Aversion Coefficient= .0046 
0 0.0 201 0 253.14 0 0 
70 95.55 197 1.99 256.47 20.97 .110 
80 109.20 192 4.48 261.10 28.63 .208 
90 122.85 186 7.46 268.34 36.21 .341 
100 136.50 172 14.4 279.01 43.52 .535 
Risk Aversion Coefficient = .oJ 00 
0 0.0 200 0 239.79 0 0 
70 95.55 193 3.62 244.59 20.86 .113 
80 I 09.20 188 6.00 250.52 29.04 .210 
90 122.85 180 10.00 259.03 36.77 .345 
100 136.50 161 19.50 270.93 44.09 .556 
Table 4. Results for revenue insurance for uncorrelated yields and prices (p s = 0) 
Coverage Level Risk Neutrality 
Probability 
Certainty Expected of 
Mean Revenue Revenue Fertilizer Rate Reduction Equivalence Claims Claims 
percent ($/ac) (lb/ac) percent ($/ac) ($/ac) probability 
0 0.0 202 0 269.78 0 0 
70 210.06 196 2.97 275.54 34.64 .169 
80 240.06 191 5.45 282.21 45.28 .280 
90 270.00 182 9.90 292.62 56.91 .416 
100 300.08 167 17.3 307.41 70.59 .570 
Risk Aversion Coefficient= .0046 
0 0.0 201 0 252.13 0 0 
70 210.06 191 4.98 261.55 34.61 .172 
80 240.06 184 8.46 270.84 45.52 .286 
90 270.07 172 14.4 284.16 57.22 .430 
100 300.08 150 25.4 301.90 72.85 .596 
Risk Aversion Coefficient= .0100 
0 0.0 198 0 233.98 0 0 
70 210.06 184 7.07 248.65 34.73 .177 
80 240.06 173 14.1 260.89 45.56 .300 
90 270,07 156 21.2 277.21 58.58 .452 
100 300.08 122 38.4 297.92 77.77 .646 
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Table 5. Results for revenue in insurance for correlated yields and prices (p, ~ -.3) 
Coverage Level Risk Neutrality 
Probability 
Certainty Expected of 
Mean Revenue Revenue Fertilizer Rate Reduction Equivalence Claims Claims 
percent ($/ac) (lb/ac) percent ($/ac) ($/ac) probability 
0 0.0 202 0 265.64 0 0 
70 207.16 198 1.98 268.79 27.67 .116 
80 236.75 193 4.46 273.82 36.97 .226 
90 266.35 183 9.41 282.91 45.75 .394 
100 295.94 165 18.3 297.25 60.17 .574 
Risk Aversion Coefficient~ .0046 
0 0.0 201 0 253.15 0 0 
70 207.16 195 2.99 258.20 27.84 .116 
80 236.75 188 6.47 265.16 36.54 .234 
90 266.35 174 11.9 276.63 46.11 .408 
I 00 295.94 150 25.4 293.52 61.97 .598 
Risk Aversion Coefficient~ 0.0100 
0 0.0 200 0 239.79 0 0 
70 207.16 190 5.00 247.73 27.69 .120 
80 236.75 181 9.50 257.04 37.07 .239 
90 266.35 161 19.5 271.15 47.01 .430 
100 295.94 122 39.0 290.74 67.15 .658 
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